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Information, Trust and Transparency 
Recently a couple seeking a mortgage was given a strange task.  Write out a “motivational 
letter,” their lender asked them, an essay explaining their desire for a loan.  They were to 
tell why they wanted the house, if they planned to have children, why they were moving, 
and other details that probed into their personal lives.  Although they had excellent credit, 
high FICO scores, and little existing debt, the lender nonetheless wanted more.  What was 
sought, it seemed, could only be provided in a narrative.1 
We are used to thinking of credit reporting in its modern, quantitative form, but the 
genre of communication about credit in the nineteenth century was largely a narrative one.  
Through close assessment of a person’s character, as revealed in their life story, merchants 
and lenders established a sense of the risks they undertook when extending credit.  The 
usual assumption in history is that these somewhat quaint assessments gave way to a 
“harder,” more quantitative form as the sources of numerical data increased, and the 
machinery to process it improved.  Yet the recent credit crisis has called into question the 
security, objectivity and certainty of modern credit (and other debt) reporting.  Reversion 
to a narrative mode, it would seem, is what happens when lenders no longer have faith in 
abstract systems. 
I would like to suggest that we take this moment of crisis to look more deeply into 
the black box of algorithms and regressions that constitute the contemporary means of 
assessing risk.  We can do this by looking back into the history and evolution of credit 
reporting.  In most accounts, the history of credit reporting is something like this:  better 
information leads to greater transparency, producing trust between parties to an exchange.  P a g e  | 2 
 
Trust arises as transparency eliminates information asymmetries that otherwise would 
permit strategic behavior, guile, and deceptive practices and misrepresentations.  With 
better information, lenders more easily assess borrowers, establishing the risks of default 
or fraud, and price credit accordingly.  Indeed, with true transparency, borrowers also have 
a clear view on lenders, allowing them to strike the best bargain.  Because all see all, 
competing lenders will seek out the good credit risks, offering favorable terms, driving 
down borrowing costs and interest rates.  Poor credit risks are segregated out, but they still 
win.  Rather than “rationing” credit, that is, simply denying it to poor risks, lenders are able 
to reckon the risk of loss correctly, and so offer credit to bad risks at an appropriately 
higher rate of interest. 2  This then is a Pauline story—before creditors and debtors saw 
each other as through a glass darkly; now, they see face to face. 
Embedded in this story are multiple undefined concepts and strong assumptions, 
most notably about information itself.  Information is taken to be a homogenous resource, 
available for expropriation.  The act of gathering, processing and making information useful 
may be difficult and costly, but it is essentially no different than what is required for any 
input.  I would like to start from a different point:  Information is not given by nature; it 
does not stand outside of people and their institutions, exerting a disciplining force on their 
behavior.  Rather, it is created through the interactions of actors.  Many implications might 
follow from this assertion, but the one I will emphasize is the irreducibility of strategizing.   
If humans can strategize, withhold, misrepresent, and seek information advantages when 
exchanging goods or capital, they can also do these same things when exchanging 
information.  They can strategize about the very information that, putatively, is leading us 
to greater clarity and transparency.   P a g e  | 3 
 
In place of a progressive narrative of science and objectivity, I offer a less 
deterministic tale, one that follows not the arc of continual improvement in knowledge and 
technique, but navigates a fog of competing interests, contending values, ambiguous legal 
rulings, and varying institutions.  Instead of smooth progress, one finds stasis, periodic 
crises, new starts, temporarily patched solutions, all produced and maintained through 
strenuous, but largely unseen labor.  If credit assessment “works” it does so only in 
moments of carefully wrought stability, resting upon conventions as to what constitutes 
valid information.  The conventions may be quite durable, though when they break down 
seemingly clear information turns opaque once more, or worse deceptive.  It losses the 
ability to convey meaning, in the same way that counterfeit money calls into question a 
monetary system.  During moments of epistemological crisis, actors will often turn to new 
(or old) ways of establishing meaning.3 
 
Credit and Credit Reporting 
Credit has been used throughout history, and wherever there has been credit, so too there 
has been some way to assess credit worthiness.4  In many cases, assessment methods were 
the same or similar whether the credit was used to finance long distance trade, purchase 
real property or lubricate the wheel of consumption.  It is tempting to assume that today all 
forms of credit assessment are converging into one highly rational model using behavioral 
predictors to construct statistically valid inferences to measure default and other risks.  But 
a closer look at the past reveals striking differences in types of credit assessment for types 
of credit, differences that have persisted into the present.  Even where there has been 
convergence, the history of credit reporting show distinctive paths of development in P a g e  | 4 
 
different credit markets that cannot be explained as simply the gradual diffusion of 
technique.  Following these paths of development allows us to open up the black boxes of 
method and technique, to see how and why credit assessment operates the way it does, and 
also why it can at times become unhinged. 
What makes credit reporting work is a heterogeneous technology, an assemblage of 
machines, methods, forms of knowledge, embedded past practices and institutions that 
include law, politics and cultural values.  Change can be slow and partial in this system, or it 
can come quickly when new institutions or knowledge artifacts are added to the 
assemblage.  Among the actors involved in construction the credit reporting assemblage, 
motivations and interests vary greatly.  One the one hand, all parties have a certain interest 
in sharing information.  Creditors can focus a more exacting beam of inquiry on borrowers 
by uncovering aspects of their behavior hidden in the records and ledgers of other lenders.  
Yet for just this reason, creditors also have disincentives to share information.  If creditors 
pool data, they open themselves up to competition.  Each creditor reveals who among his 
family of borrowers is the best credit risk, an opportunity for others to go poaching with 
more attractive terms and interest rates.  The result could be a frenzy of competition, 
lowering creditor profits.5 
To the borrower, having more lenders compete for business should make credit 
cheaper.  On the other hand, a wily borrower has incentive to keep information about 
himself separate from lender to lender—to represent himself in the best possible light in 
each case when he is seeking credit.  This does not imply fraud (though it might) but simply 
an effort by the borrower to gain advantage by controlling representation, that is, the 
construction and release of information.  Bad risks have reason to hide in the crowd of P a g e  | 5 
 
good risks, for once the bad risk is exposed, he will pay a higher cost of credit.  Although in 
theory good risk borrowers might shun and push out the bad risks, such behavior requires 
mechanisms of communication and coordination not usually available to individual 
borrowers.  Moreover, for any individual there is a degree of uncertainty as to whether 
they will be accounted a good or bad risk.  Such uncertainty works against voluntarily 
giving up more information than absolutely necessary.6   
The calculus of information sharing plays out in different ways among different 
classes of borrower and lenders.  Business borrowers, for example, may be highly 
dependent on trade credit to stay in business.  Yet they may also strongly resist intrusive 
credit reporting.  They fear the loss of the credit, and they foresee danger in revealing their 
methods of operation to competitors.  Consumers too might resist the potential disciplinary 
effects of credit reporting, but changes in “lifestyle” can be easier to effect than changes in 
business practice that reflect unique competitive skills and strategic position.  In short, 
there is reason to suspect (and historical evidence to show) that the sort of seamless, 
continuous, easily quantifiable shared information that modern credit scoring uses is 
extremely difficult to achieve.  Institutional context plays a substantial role in determining 
what information is revealed, if, when and where it is shared, and what resulting credit 
reporting and scoring apparatus develops. 
We can see this process at work by comparing the different ways in which trade and 
consumer credit evolved in the United States.  Trade credit reporting was and has 
remained much less systematized and quantified than consumer credit reporting.  The 
trade credit market relies less on shared information and more on narrative reporting.  
While consumer credit reporting began in the early twentieth century with similar P a g e  | 6 
 
features, it moved in a much different direction, particularly after World War II.  Trade 
associations, banks, and credit card systems developed an effective information sharing 
network that pushed consumer credit reporting into quantitative scoring.  Below I discuss 
these different histories, and explore what they tell us about the process of creating, 
circulating and stabilizing information into a form suitable for decision making. 
 
Trade Credit and R. G. Dun 
In America, trade credit reporting has since the nineteenth century been performed largely 
through specialized intermediaries, notably R. D. Dun (Dun & Bradstreet) and a small 
number of competitors.  Today the field is almost completely dominated by Dun & 
Bradstreet, except where organizations that began in the consumer credit market have 
begun to move into business credit reporting as well.    
From its origins in 1841 through roughly the 1890s, Dun relied almost exclusively 
on local attorneys to scout up information on local retailers, storekeepers and merchants, 
which information was then sent, in written reports, to the New York headquarters.  There 
it was entered into huge ledger books that Dun clients (lenders) could view.  The original 
purpose of this system was to give New York wholesalers information on local retailers to 
whom they shipped goods on book credit payable at 30, 60, or 90 days.  But information 
did not stay in New York.7  Over time, as wholesaling moved out of the eastern cities, Dun 
opened offices in the interior.  Information thus circulated both from the hinterland to New 
York, from New York to regional offices, within the territory of the regional offices, and, 
eventually between the regional offices as well.    P a g e  | 7 
 
  The Dun system (and those of its competitors) depended on a carefully constructed, 
but unstable confluence of interests.  Local lawyers agreed to serve as information agents 
not for pay, but in the expectation that when a debtor failed, they would be retained to 
collect the debt.  This was a potentially lucrative business.  Dun’s clients, the New York 
wholesalers, had interest in obtaining as much information on potential borrowers as 
possible, but they did not have incentive to share what they knew about their own 
customers with Dun or with each other.  No wholesaler wanted to encourage competition 
by revealing who his best customers in New Orleans or Cincinnati were.  Dun, meanwhile, 
had every incentive to collect information—as much as possible on as many businesses as 
possible—to make the size of its information network a selling point.   
Information networks frequently face the classic “chicken and egg” or network 
externality problem.8  Buyers of information (the New York wholesalers in this case) will 
only subscribe to an information network if coverage is sufficient to make it useful.  Sellers 
of information (Dun in this case) can only afford to collect information if there is a clear 
market for selling it.  The local attorneys resolved this problem because they could collect 
the needed information with little or no upfront cost to Dun.  Yet this structure also made it 
imperative that Dun control the information flow to exclude non-subscribers.  If 
information were freely available, then Dun would never profit from its investment in 
collecting and processing.   Finally, the objects of surveillance, the retailers, had mixed 
motives.  They needed to be seen to obtain credit, but they resisted too much or the wrong 
sort (in their view) of surveillance that might result in cutting off the lifeblood of credit.  
The retailer/borrowers thus had strong incentive to shape how they appeared in the Dun 
reports and ledgers. P a g e  | 8 
 
  Aligning diverse interests was crucial to keeping the system in operation, and points 
of conflict were numerous throughout the nineteenth century.  Retail merchants, for 
example, continually questioned the competence and honesty of the reporting attorneys, as 
well as the security and objectivity of the collected reports.   After all, given the payment 
system, attorneys would benefit if a business failed, since they would be given charge of 
collections.9  Attack on “secret surveillance” and the uncontested power of Dun’s 
information network continued from start of credit reporting to the end of the nineteenth 
century, and beyond.10  Legal cases went back and forth through the nineteenth century.  
Courts sometimes blessed credit reporting as a valuable commercial service.  Other times 
they condemned it as detrimental to those it surveyed, and unreliable to those it served. 
It was not clear to credit reporting firms how to respond to these conflicting 
messages.  On the one hand, critics were charging that the firms were remote, imperious 
entities with little understanding of the facts on the ground, running information systems 
of questionable accuracy.   On the other hand, they rebuked the “spying system” for being 
too personal and intimate when it pried into the “associations, the business, the family, and 
the personal habits of every man engaged in trade.”11  Generally, the credit reporters 
countered these charges by emphasizing thoroughness and comprehensiveness—no 
merchant was given a free pass, none were ignored or placed outside the system, and all 
were given a close reading by those best positioned to understand local conditions.   
Creditors looked upon credit reporting with conflicting feelings as well.  Small 
wholesalers, for example, often feared that the largest Dun clients got the best information 
first.  This was a great concern when it came to bankruptcy and failure.  The vagaries of 
American bankruptcy law meant that the first unsecured creditor on the scene had the best P a g e  | 9 
 
chance of being repaid.  Given the lack of certainty about order of payment, borrowers 
could also exploit creditors, paying their largest creditors first, while keeping the smaller 
ones dangling for as long as possible.12  These conditions in turn made creditors unwilling 
to rely on the local attorneys for collection work, trusting their own lawyers to better 
represent their interests.  But without payment in the form of collections, local attorneys 
had little incentive to do credit reporting.   
Finally, credit reporting firms had to worry about the legitimacy of the entire 
enterprise, and the potential losses from leakage of information.  To secure legitimacy—in 
the eyes of borrower, lenders and the courts—R. G. Dun placed great stress on the intimate 
knowledge of its attorneys on the scene, an argument that both aimed to persuade its 
clients that it had command of the facts, while convincing local retailers that what was sent 
to New York was thorough and complete.  “The local agent,” explained R. G. Dun founder 
Lewis Tappan, “…having his eye on every trader of importance in his country, and noting 
down as it occurs, every circumstance affecting his credit…becomes better acquainted with 
his actual condition than any stranger can be.”13  “As near as possible to personal 
acquaintance…” wrote Hunt’s Merchant’s Magazine.14  Credit reporting was merely doing in 
systematic fashion the same thing “as merchants usually employ—only on an extended 
plan—to ascertain whether persons applying for credit are worthy of the same and to what 
extent.”15  Rather than depersonalizing credit information, Dun and other agencies 
repersonalized it, seeking to stabilize the credit market by attending closely to the intimate 
details of the business, and the businessman (or woman).16 
The quest for legal legitimacy and the dangers of information leakage shaped Dun’s 
approach to collating and conveying information as well.  The massive ledgers in New York P a g e  | 10 
 
only yielded their secrets to clients who presented a valid ticket at the office.17  Clerks then 
read the information contained within, allowing the interested merchant to take notes, 
unless the information was considered too inflammatory.  To save time most clients sent 
their own “confidential clerk” to receive the information, a procedure that was shaped by 
American libel law.  Throughout the nineteenth century, Dun and other credit reporting 
firms lived under threat of libel or slander suits, shielded only by the common law doctrine 
of privileged communication.  The law of privilege protected credit reporting as a 
legitimate and necessary exchange of business intelligence, but only if the information was 
conveyed to interested parties (the creditors), and not widely dispersed.  It was generally 
safe only to have the principal of a mercantile establishment or an employee designated as 
his confidential clerk hear the report.  The result was the cumbersome in-person reading, 
though in this case legal necessity dovetailed nicely with the credit agency’s desire to 
prevent non-subscribers access to its books. 
These procedures clearly worked against efficient circulation of information, and 
hence against transparency.18  If information wants to be free, it found little liberty in this 
system.  What the system did provide, however, was a powerful mechanism for 
establishing meanings, and hence the conventions of judgment and decision making.   
At the simplest level Dun merely wrote down, organized and read out what its local 
agents had found—just the “facts.”  Facts were a good defense against charges of prejudice, 
incompetence or libel.  Much turned on the completeness of the reports, as well as the 
repetition of collecting over time, showing freshness of data.   Collecting lots of data, in 
diverse form, continually, made a case for the virtues of credit reporting to both clients and 
subjects.  And it also placated the courts.  The larger the percentage of the business P a g e  | 11 
 
community covered by reporting, then the more likely a court would see it as a standard, 
useful business practice.19  But what was a fact, and where did the collecting end?  As the 
ledgers of R. G. Dun filled up, as new reports layered on top of older ones, rich detail 
threatened to become a messy collection of discreet bits of data and bare facts open to any 
interpretation.  Given the constraints imposed by the structure of interests and the law, 
credit reporting evolved a narrative form to deal with this issue. 
Narrative is a way of giving shape and meaning to information.  Among its virtues, it 
provides a clear guide to how to organize the raw data (chronologically, with a beginning, 
middle and end), and a sense of causation.  It can be a powerful way of knowing, even when 
dealing with the more reductive information forms of credit scores today.20  By connecting 
one event, one behavior to another, narrative builds a sense of predictability and outcome.  
As facts are marshaled into a story, it becomes clear what caused what, as well as the 
lessons and inferences to be drawn.  By linking seemingly random occurrences into a 
meaningful pattern, narrative distinguishes the vital from the inessential, the necessary 
from the ephemeral. 
Although many discussions of nineteenth century credit reporting stress the role of 
character—the traits of an individual that predicted a likelihood of payment—character 
was only one element of the narrative.  Narrative put character into motion, giving both 
micro level detail as well as macro level context.  It pointed to a conclusion, but avoided 
direct judgment or advice, which would have overstepped the legally secure territory of 
confidentiality.  Indeed, it was the non-fixed nature of character and identity that gave 
power and legitimacy to credit surveillance.  One could rise or fall by one’s own actions, as 
reflected in the plot of one’s own life.   P a g e  | 12 
 
Scott Sandage has explicated the many culturally encoded meanings carried in the 
credit reports—of good and bad borrowers, or of those who deserved a second chance and 
those beyond hope of redemption.  Narratives of business, credit and character have a long 
history, going well back into the early days of commercial society.21  In starting the credit 
reporting agency, Lewis Tappan drew on this tradition by emphasizing the moral lessons 
his ledgers conveyed.22  No one could object if the information clearly distinguished the 
deserving from the undeserving and followed the long history of prudence in lending 
money.  The power of persuasion and authenticity in the credit reports came from this 
sense of narrative causation, which denied that occurrences were merely random and 
showed that the ledgers contained meaningful data.  The ability of Dun reporters to shape 
field reports into compelling narratives both solved the problem of conflicting interests and 
legal precedent, while constituting a saleable product, built from the strategic advantages 
of information processing that Dun possessed.    
Finally, the narrative mode fended off legal challenges and public criticism.  By their 
very nature, narratives require the active participation of the reader.  Although different 
narrative tropes may prefigure different causal mechanisms and imply different outcomes, 
the reader also brings his or her own ideas and preconceptions to the reading.  Good 
narrative reports could both make sense out of messy detail and complex reality, yet leave 
the reader (the creditor) free to draw his or her own conclusions.  Unlike modern, 
quantitative methods of credit reporting, it was much harder to show in a court a clear 
connection between the language of the report and a decision by a creditor.23 
Narrative proved extremely durable in trade credit reporting.  To see this, consider 
the counter case of the credit ratings books.  Ratings were introduced by R. G. Dun P a g e  | 13 
 
competitor John Bradstreet in 1857.  The Bradstreet rating system gave the appearance of 
objective, quantifiable data, but in fact it was originally simply a way to encode narrative 
information.  The ratings were decoded with a key that told the reader if the person was of 
“good character” or a “slow payer.”  This method had communications advantages.  It was 
easier to distribute and periodically update the ratings book than to have merchants call at 
the office.  By using a code, Bradstreet avoided the legal danger of circulating information 
outside the umbrella of privilege.  But his rating book was more like the telegraphic code 
books of the era—substituting a single word or number for a common phrase as a way to 
reduce the cost of transmitting information.24  Ratings, in this incarnation, still constituted 
a narrative.   
R. G. Dun resisted entering the ratings book competition, but eventually it did so, 
with a more quantitatively based product.  The Dun book actually connected a value—a 
firm’s capital worth—to a rating (A, B, C).  It provided as well a non-quantitative 
assessment, a boiled down version of the narrative in the form of a rating letter reflecting 
“willingness to pay.”  But the ratings were an innovation that had more to do with 
competition between reporting firms and efficiency of information conveyance than with 
content and form.  The Dun rating book, for example, made tracking borrowers much 
easier.  It assigned a unique number to each firm in its index.  The index, however, was a 
functional appendage to the narrative reports, not an alternative; that is, it enabled users to 
get more frequent report updates.  Here Dun took advantage of another part of the 
information assemblage, daily newspapers.  Whenever new information arrived, Dun 
would post a newspaper advertisement to “call at office” concerning X firm, identified not 
by its name but by its number.  Since the code was only decipherable by clients holding a P a g e  | 14 
 
rating book, Dun protected itself against the charge of libel, while allowing patrons to 
update their information regularly.  Non-subscribers, of course, had no way of free riding, 
since they knew neither the firm being referred to, nor the new information that had 
arrived.25   
In its promotional literature Dun reminded clients that the ratings implied no 
endorsement or recommendation—they were not to be used as a simple scoring 
methodology.  And it made sure to price the ratings books so that they did not undercut the 
detailed reports.26  Nor did the ratings, even those for capital worth, reflect hard, 
standardized data.  Many, indeed most of the firms that were rated either kept rudimentary 
books, or none at all.  Without widely used and accepted standards of accounting, 
calculations of net worth were done on a case by case basis by individual agents.  
Instructions from the New York office provided general guidance on how to do this, but 
both the raw data and final figure reflected the judgment of the agent. 
It was of course in Dun’s self-interest to maintain the narrative reports.  By the late 
19th century, the firm had accumulated a substantial databank of information and a well-
established network of clients, contacts, agents and credit subjects.  Sustaining this 
network was expensive.  New offices meant more sites in the information node.  To 
improve the quality and depth of information, and to reduce the problem of conflicting 
incentives, Dun replaced the unpaid local attorneys with salaried employees, and instituted 
a stricter administration to direct and guide their work into a well-researched but 
standardized product.27  But there was little incentive for Dun to make ratings so reductive 
and precise that they replaced the detailed reports on which the ratings where based; and P a g e  | 15 
 
precise ratings might well have been taken as endorsement or rejection of a particular 
debtor, raising the danger of law suits. 
Despite the increased speed and compactness of the rating book, there was simply 
too much variation from case to case to allow ratings to fully replace the narrative.  The 
rating for creditworthiness (willingness to pay) was conceptually distinct from the rating 
for capacity (capital worth).  Yet, as Dun admonished, it was impossible to rate a small local 
retailer A for credit when A was the highest rating that could be given out to a giant 
merchant like Marshall Field, whose capacity and capital were obviously many times larger.  
But lowering the rating of the local merchant distorted the information about willingness 
to pay.  If credit reporting substituted for the watchful eye of the lending merchant, it could 
not use a rating system missed nuance and subtlety.  There was, moreover, little evidence 
that the rating scheme was predictive of failure, or even that a firm would be rated the 
same way by two different agencies.28  Finally, credit decisions by lenders were based on a 
variety of considerations—how good a customer the borrower was, how many other 
customers were in that market, the need to expand sales. 
Efforts to create a different reporting system, one based more on shared, 
quantifiable data also failed to displace the narrative reporting style.  By the late nineteenth 
century, merchants began to organize in trade associations and to professionalize the 
credit function.29  High on their list of goals was ledger exchange, whereby lenders shared 
with each other the credit and payment behavior of their customers.30  In this way, the 
credit men argued, they would have an objective basis for credit decisions.  They pressed R. 
G. Dun and other reporting agencies to collect ledger information as well.31 P a g e  | 16 
 
Ledger sharing, however, never became the dominant practice in trade credit.32  
Even in 1920, 70% of orders were made using credit agencies as the information source, 
rather than shared ledger information.  Merchants themselves were reluctant to pass 
ledger information on to Dun, which they saw as “giving information into the hands of 
those who will market it for money-making purposes.”33  A credit clearing house started by 
the National Association of Credit Men faltered.34  For all the good will and expressions of 
solidarity in the literature of professional associations, the fact remained that sharing 
information ran against self-interest.  Greater transparency eliminated informational 
advantages, particularly among the largest wholesalers who also had the best ledger data.   
“A very serious handicap, and one that seems to be growing,” noted R. G. Dun, “is the refusal 
of many lending houses to give any information about their customers.”35  True, an 
effective credit information sharing system would have undermined Dun’s business model.  
But the firm thrived because it mediated the conflict between merchants’ desire for better 
information and their goal of keeping their own information private.  Dun obtained 
information from all parties, but only gave out information after it had been processed into 
reports, thus keeping the source of the raw data secret.36  
Thus through the start of the twentieth century, R. G. Dun and its narrative mode of 
reporting remained by far the most important source of trade credit information.  This did 
not mean that the firm stood still.  In fact, Dun innovated, but mostly in the direction of 
reducing the cost of producing narratives and increasing the speed of user access.  
Typewriters and manifold (carbon) paper allowed for processing multiple copies of reports 
at the same time, which could then be sent to regional offices.  This ended reliance on the 
heavy ledgers and the expense of laboriously copying out the ledger entries in a new set of P a g e  | 17 
 
books every time an office opened.  The manifold distribution process sent copies of 
reports to the appropriate offices, based on likelihood of demand.37  These offices in turn 
would be called upon to share information with other offices where necessary.  To make 
the system self-supporting, each regional office cultivated its own client base, which made 
complete reportage both necessary (each office blanketed its own region) and also a 
strategic advantage—providing a system that could claim total national coverage.38  
Rather than eliminating the narrative, Dun modernized it.  It emphasized 
professionalism, standardization and organization.39  It refined its instructions to agents, 
asking them to produce information in a more efficient form.  But it also refined rather than 
deconstructed the art of the narrative form.  Writers were admonished to avoid trite or 
stock phrases.  “The business facts usually tell their own tale,” reporters were reminded, 
yet they were also told how to shape that tale in a way that would reveal important 
insights, such as “if the history of the individual or firm discloses uniform success for many 
years,” which was assumed to provide “evidence of the standard virtues.”40  Reporters 
aimed to filter out the trifling details while providing a chronology of the major 
developments in the subject’s life.  They practiced their craft until they developed an 
intuitive “agency sense” of how much detail to include, when and how much to revise 
information from period to period.41   
Into the twentieth century, business opinion was split on the virtues of this 
narrative system.   The tireless promoter of credit science, Peter Earling, claimed that the 
handling of credit information had “undergone a radical change” at the end of the 
nineteenth century toward a more quantitative form.  “The dispensing of credit had been 
reduced, if not to a science, at least to a study on scientific lines,” he wrote.42  But others P a g e  | 18 
 
were not so sure, in an age when business and financial data were still haphazard and 
idiosyncratic.  “Our impressions of men and things seldom proceed from logical 
deductions,” opined T. J Zimmerman in his 1904 book on credit.  “They are intuitional, and 
an ounce of intuition is worth a pound of logic when we come to reckon with human nature 
and its manifold ramifications.”43  Even ratings on capital worth had to be understood as 
judgments.  “It would be impossible to attempt a description of the relative credit of 
merchants,” agreed William Prendergast in his 1906 book Credit and Its Uses.”44  Printed 
forms, ledger data, field reports from salesmen could all help but the fact remained, “in no 
field of credit information are better results secured than through the instrumentality of 
oral investigations.”45   
With the growth in lines of trade and the geographical dispersal of business in the 
twentieth century, credit managers faced an informational dilemma.  They were 
“frequently overwhelmed with a mass of voluminous reports.” 46  At the same time, they 
believed that they could not have too much information, and so read reports carefully lest 
some important fact slip by.  Attitudes toward risk varied almost firm by firm, and different 
lenders employed different credit strategies—some seeking to minimize losses, others to 
use credit liberally to build sales.  Most therefore adhered to “Hoyne’s Law:”  When in 
doubt, get more information.47  The best credit reporters learned to express important facts 
with brevity and conciseness, while the best credit managers learned to summarize 
reports, create briefs and paste the briefs into a card or ledger system for future reference.   
These information handling methods made it possible to track a greater volume of debts 
over a longer period of time, but they supported rather than supplanted the narrative mode 
of assessing and judging credit worthiness. P a g e  | 19 
 
Over time, R. G. Dun developed new forms of information, either to provide greater 
context or to differentiate levels of detail.  Registered Supervised Reports delved into 
business methods and practices, while more extensive Analytical Reports included 
information on personnel, subsidiaries, and so far as possible, banking.48  At the same time, 
Dun expanded beyond mercantile credit to survey manufactures, brokers, and independent 
tradespeople and professionals—from blacksmith and grain dealers, to dentists and 
publishers.  The sheer scale had increased, to some 1.3 million ratings, which required 
750,000 changes per year and the answering of 5,000 requests per day.49  But we should 
not mistake size and scale for transparency.  Indeed, the greater complexity of credit 
reporting meant multiple information sources, more competing products, and “extra” data 
to satisfy merchants’ desire for more.  If transparency means an agreed upon standard of 
information and clear criteria for decision making, credit reporting was far from that.   
Dun’s competitive success if anything required it to gather more information than 
necessary for efficient credit evaluation.  It provided many facts so as to avoid the 
appearance of bias or opinion, dangerous legal territory inviting libel suits.50  As guides for 
reporters put it “Don’t give advice; when you have submitted all the facts in your 
possession, Stop!” 51  Safe legal advice to be sure, but on its own it made meaning and 
precision in reporting more difficult to achieve.  The narrative thus offered a way to subtly 
shape and direct the attention of the reader, steer clear of legal entanglements, and provide 
the variety of data that credit managers said they needed. “The report is a story,” noted the 
Dun guide to report writers, an effective story well told.  It was written in plain, non-
technical language, without lengthy digressions.  It built in chronological stages until 
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In all, the narrative style proved remarkably durable.  “There has been no 
fundamental change in Agency reporting in the last fifty years,” stated the Dun handbook in 
1944, “simply because there has been no change in the attitude of creditors toward 
debtors, actual or prospective. “52  Even though Dun continued to offer numerical ratings, 
the story had to illuminate and justify the ratings, which in turn had to be set to reflect the 
facts of the story.  Improved information technology allowed for faster processing and 
distribution, greater range of factual data, and cross referencing of other information 
sources.   Dun, or after 1934 Dun & Bradstreet, rode the wave of post-World War II 
information technology, microfilming and shipping trade data to regional offices, instituting 
a numbering system to allow businesses to identify themselves in machine readable form 
(the Duns Universal Numbering Systems, D U N S).53  In certain trade lines where speed 
was of essence and information turned over rapidly--as women’s apparel and dry goods--
the Credit Clearing Division provided a limited degree of credit scoring.54  Yet for the most 
part the craft nature of trade credit reporting remained.  Company literature continued to 
stress the expert agent or reporter who “observes his community,” and the many close-at-
hand regional offices, as the legitimate structure for gathering sensitive data.55  Following 
the trend in consumer reporting practices, Dun & Bradstreet in 1974 created a predictive 
scoring algorithm, DUNSCORE, using accounts receivable data from firms that had 
computerized their accounting.56  But many firms did not participate in this system, and 
banks, a major source of credit information, were still reluctant to share customer 
information. 57  In 2001, Dun & Bradstreet conducted some 4 million interviews and sent 
out 1 million direct mail requests, compared to 94,000 cases of shared trade data and 200 
banks sharing credit information. 58 P a g e  | 21 
 
Consumer Credit Reporting 
Consumer credit reporting followed a different path than that of trade credit.  Although 
consumer credit also relied on narrative techniques initially, it shifted toward a reductive, 
“hard,” quantitative signal in the 1970s and 80s.  The reasons for this lie in the different set 
of actors in the consumer credit reporting market, the different structure of interests, and 
the different legal, political and cultural context. 
Although perhaps not as old as trade credit, consumer credit has a history that 
extends back into the nineteenth century, and in some forms, to pre modern times.  Family, 
ethnic group members, private lenders, and pawnshops have been used by individuals for 
loans and credit since at least the late middle ages, and probably much earlier.  Book credit 
for consumers seems to have been commonplace in rural stores and among urban retailers 
for several centuries.  Butchers, bakers, saloon keepers, and grocers carried their 
customers’ charges month to month.59  These long standing practices were monitored by 
the close local connections that bound debtors and lenders, which allowed behavioral 
monitoring.  Put simply, one did not generally lend or extend credit to true strangers.  
Where credit was more widely and generally granted, it was still restricted to certain 
presumed safe categories of people.  Urban department stores offered book credit to their 
better customers, but more as a service and convenience than a source of profit.60 
Formal, contractual types of consumer credit arose at the end of the nineteenth 
century to finance purchases of durable goods.  Furniture and pianos could be acquired 
using chattel mortgage contracts by the 1870s and 80s, while the ubiquitous Singer Sewing 
machine was available on installment from the 1860s.  By the twentieth century, 
consumers could use installment payments to buy large items, notably the automobile, as P a g e  | 22 
 
well as smaller household articles, through credit available via finance companies.61  
Department stores continued to offer book credit.  For smaller, personal loans, salaried 
workers could turn to lenders who executed contracts that required repayment over a 
period of months in regular installments.62  In all, by 1929, roughly 20% of all retail sales 
were made on credit.63 
Credit monitoring and reporting for the consumer market was done through a 
variety of mechanisms.  Agents and sales people maintained close contact with installment 
purchasers, while the chattel mortgage contracts gave lenders recourse through reposition.  
As much as anything, repossession was a disciplinary technique through embarrassment, 
as the borrower imagined in horror the family sofa or piano dragged out of the house.  
Personal loans depended on the relative stability of employment in large firms, which was 
more common by the twentieth century, as well as the regularity of a paycheck that 
corporations could provide.  To assure compliance with repayment, lenders threatened to 
contact employers and garnishee wages.64 
  Information serving the consumer credit market at first resembled that in trade 
credit--diverse forms of data, assembled a file, constructing a life narrative.  Investigators 
sought close familiarity with debtors.  Chattel mortgage lenders, for example, took careful 
inventory of the homes of borrowers, both to record in detail the property securing the 
mortgage (making repossession easier) and also to assess the character of the borrower in 
the most personal of settings.65  Uncertainty about what information mattered and a desire 
to accumulate potentially useful data drove credit reporting on personal and consumer 
loans in the early decades of the twentieth century, much as it continued to drive trade 
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credit bureaus across the nation performed this function, in addition to the in-house files 
kept in retailers’ credit departments.   
By the 1920, the patterns of reporting in consumer credit started to diverge from 
those in trade credit.  Where wholesalers found it difficult to share information on their 
borrowers, this was not the case with retail stores.  Where trade credit was not easily 
reduced to a scoring system, consumer credit began accumulating data of the form that 
made scoring much easier.   
Stores tracked their customers carefully.  They used coins, tokens and charge cards 
to monitor customers’ lines of credit and identify patterns of purchases.  Perhaps the most 
notable and effective of these tracking systems was the Charge-a-Plate,  first adopted by 
Filene’s Department Store in 1929, then spreading to other stores in the 1930s and 40s.  A 
metal square embossed with the customer’s name, address and account number, charge 
plates were run through a machine at the counter, automatically imprinting the identifying 
information on the sales slip.  By filing the sales slips, the credit department was assured of 
an accurate report on credit use at the individual level.66  Charge plates can be seen simply 
as a more elaborate, if still paper based data system, similar to the ones that Dun and other 
credit reporting agencies were adopting.  It fit the general move toward “systematic” office 
management in the 1920s.67  But it also marked a differentiation between consumer and 
trade credit practices, by giving the retail lender much more control over credit 
information. 
Stores overcame the inhibitions on data sharing that remained among wholesalers.  
The Boston Retail Trade Board designed a common plate with notches that would fit in the 
machines of each store with whom the customer had an account.  Board members agreed P a g e  | 24 
 
to treat each other equally, so that one store did not use the commonality of credit to steal 
customers from another.  This system also disciplined free riding, by mandating that each 
time a customer opened a new account, that store would conduct an independent 
investigation of creditworthiness.  Charge plates, and the assemblages of institutions and 
practices they embraced, helped to overcome the classic “chicken and egg” problem of 
credit and credit reporting.  Stores were willing to share information because their 
customers were part of a single monitoring network.  Customers had incentive to join the 
network because it was simple and convenient to use the same charge plate in multiple 
locations.68 
Stores were now able to capture behavioral patterns.  They could see if an 
outstanding balance had just been incurred, or had been paid down from a higher amount 
over time.  Dates of purchases, amounts, and “back ledger” data from past transactions 
provided a new range of insights on the borrower.69  At the same time, store customers 
were less mobile, and lived in a smaller information bubble than did business borrowers.  
Word that someone had failed to pay an account at one store quickly spread to the others 
because consumers had limited options about where they could shop and who would give 
them credit.  Using standardized data derived from the ledgers of all creditors using the 
same credit monitoring device, department stores were able to devise a basic “rating” 
system.70  They began to turn the narrative history of each customer into a more reductive 
norm of expected payback.   
When the Depression hit, stores became especially concerned about maintaining 
control of credit.  The older, neighborhood based, personal knowledge system frayed in the 
Depression, yet credit was more important in retailing than ever before.  By 1938, credit P a g e  | 25 
 
sales had risen to $7.8 billion, or 25% of all retail sales, up by 5% from 1929.71  Stores 
feared that customers might begin to pyramid accounts as they struggled with 
unemployment and lost wages, or would learn to game the reporting system in their favor.  
Warned one credit reporter in 1936, “a common occurrence is the discovery that the 
customer has set a trap into which he has invited the investigator to step by giving false 
information concerning his business connections and arranging it so that person at the 
business location will confirm his misstatements to enable him to obtain credit.”72  Such 
concerns drove credit and ledger sharing arrangements, as department stores expanded 
their cooperative information system to cast a wider net.   
For this they relied on independent credit bureaus, thousands located in towns and 
cities across the nation.73  Credit bureaus used a labor intensive process of gathering, 
maintaining and updating files containing diverse information about individuals’ finances, 
property, and personal lives.  The bureau file included notions on divorces, liens, chattel 
mortgages, bankruptcies, marriages, deaths, and “skips” (leaving town without paying a 
bill).  Credit bureaus also collected information on a far larger number of individuals than a 
single store or group of stores.  Though highly localized, credit bureaus developed an 
effective means of interchanging data—in part because the localized nature of the 
information meant that they were not in competition with each other.  Retailers were wary 
about revealing information on customers that could fall into competitors’ hands.  But they 
were willing to send ledger, trade and payment information through the local credit 
bureau, which in turn maintained an information network across the nation through a 
trade association, the Associated Credit Bureaus of America.  Mail and telephone, 
particularly the growth of a fast long distance telephone network by the late 1930s (and P a g e  | 26 
 
even faster direct dialing of long distance calls by the 1950s), made interexchange of data 
among brother credit bureaus efficient and effective, giving credence to the industry’s 
motto, “Your Credit Bureau Follows You like a Shadow.”74 
 As the monitoring of consumer credit expanded to a national scale, credit scoring 
and reductive quantitative scoring actually decreased for a time in favor of richer 
contextual data.  Indeed, the expansion of consumer credit made it difficult to determine 
what information to include and what to filter out.  Looking to the mixed experience of 
ratings in trade, consumer credit managers argued that rating books were old fashioned 
and went out of date too quickly.  Instead, the bureaus emphasized the thickness and 
thoroughness of their files.  The goal was to share information to create “one big file,” 
ideally one that would “show a complete cross section of every individual’s obligations.”75  
Detailed data had strategic advantages.  After World War II, retailers sought 
potential new recruits for credit—which was now recognized as a key tool of selling.  Credit 
bureaus could identify individuals who used installment credit, or track names and 
addresses appearing on COD labels—a noncompetitive source of new customers for local 
stores.  Or they could identify those who had just moved to town, or newlyweds, or those 
who just ordered utility service or joined clubs.  The richness of the data enabled stores to 
make strategic decisions as to which classes of customers they wanted to cultivate—by 
income, age, occupation and race. 76   
 
The Rise of the Machines 
Through the 1950s, consumer credit depended on a highly diverse, yet interconnected 
system of information collection.  That began to change.  It started with the articulation of P a g e  | 27 
 
new psychological theories of behavior, and discussions of their application to credit 
practice.  “We cannot observe changes in behavior unless we watch what a man does and 
stop cataloguing what he ‘is’ …for such cataloguing nearly always carries the implications 
of permanence and puts us off guard for change, ”  wrote credit manager Helen Sommers, 
an advocate of “credit psychology.”  Such connections could be established probabilistically, 
though Sommers did not abandon narrative and causation either.  Ask not, she advised, “Is 
he honest, is he smart?” but rather “what has he been doing, how has he solved past 
problems, what tests of debt discharging responsibly has he met or failed to meet.”77  As the 
credit manager for Trojan Hosiery Mills, Sommers was addressing the concerns of 
manufactures and wholesalers, not retailers.  As it turned out, though, it was the retail end 
of the business that more quickly adopted the behavioral model.  The reason, however, had 
to do with the market for retail credit, its institutions, organization and history, and not 
with ideas, methods or technical expertise. 
  Although retailers had developed an extensive credit reporting apparatus, they had 
done so largely to monitor fixed, open book credit.  By the 1950s, however, charge cards 
offering revolving credit began to appear, eventually supplanting then replacing store 
based credit.78  Store credit was monitored by the detailed files that retailers kept in their 
back offices, shared both locally and, through credit bureaus, nationally, for accounts that 
were paid off monthly.  Charge cards offering open ended, revolving credit, made it much 
harder to use the “stable” categories of character or personality, which as Sommers noted, 
could leave one off guard for change.   
The success of credit cards required overcoming another “chicken and egg” 
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general use, but consumers would only sign up for cards if they were widely accepted by 
retailers.  Credit cards had advantages to stores, particularly small ones, since they 
eliminated most of the record keeping, financing and monitoring costs associated with 
store based credit.  But in outsourcing credit, retailers lost control of the credit monitoring 
function, and hence the ability to control risks and promote sales.  Given how much retail 
merchants had invested in gaining control of and insight into their credit customers, the 
bank issued credit cards had to come with some inducements.  One was protection against 
loss or fraud by card users; another was data on sales and purchases by customers. 
That took care of the chicken, but what of the egg?  What would induce customers to 
sign up for cards?  The answer was mass mailing.  In 1957, Bank of America introduced the 
BankAmericard by sending it to some 60,000 California customers, and foregoing the usual 
credit background checks.79  It worked, and the card gained wide acceptance by merchants 
and customers both.  Nonetheless, Bank of America had to sustain heavy losses in the early 
years and other banks moved cautiously to follow the leader.  When Chase Manhattan Bank 
unveiled its charge card a few years later, it eschewed the mass mailings and screened 
customers the traditional way.  As a result, it failed to convince merchants to accept the 
card.80   
Credit cards would work only if banks moved aggressively in signing up customers 
and merchants.  To do so banks needed an effective system of credit monitoring and fraud 
control.  In this way they could pre-select cardholders and guarantee stores payment.  The 
capacity to continuously monitor credit use was key.  Bank of America had designed its 
credit card plan following the installation of its ERMA (Electronic Recording Method of 
Accounting) system a few years before, to speed check processing and account balancing.81  P a g e  | 29 
 
By 1957, ERMA and related information technology investments yielded more 
sophisticated databases that could connect different forms of information to create 
composite pictures of the borrower, one reason Bank of America was willing to try the 
mass mailing.  As credit cards spread outside of a single bank customer base, however, 
some means of tracking users across regions and among financial institutions was 
needed.82  This required information sharing. 
In contrast to trade market, the consumer market already had a means of credit 
information sharing, through retailer cooperation and credit bureaus and associations.  
Before 1920, consumer credit trade associations had established a common language for 
ratings and had standardized data reporting, so all information, regardless of location, was 
comparable.83  When national retailers, such as Sears, computerized their accounting 
systems in the 1950s, the industry association provided assistance to independent credit 
bureaus in accessing this data, obtaining the monthly computer tapes and distributing 
them to members, after converting the various ledger setups into a single format.84  In the 
1960s, the small, scattered credit bureaus also began to merge, creating larger databases of 
information on consumers.  Although banks had traditionally been reluctant to share 
customer information, the larger credit bureaus adopted computer and electronic data 
processing, which aligned their information structure with that of the banks, so that 
information could be shared by exchanging computer tapes.85   
Finally, new actors from the electronics industry entered the credit reporting 
market in the 1960s.  Their presence was especially important to credit cards.  Taking 
advantage of increasing computer processing power, they designed credit verification 
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cards could be used securely for store purchases, with little waiting.  The early systems 
were “semi-automatic.”  A merchant telephoned in a credit charge to the bank, where a 
clerk accessed the computer.  Still, even by 1964 a transaction could be confirmed or 
declined within 90 seconds.86 
Companies with expertise in electronics and information further promoted credit 
information sharing and data consolidation.   In 1969, TRW acquired Credit Data, which 
had started in the 1930s as the Michigan Credit Association, a bureau serving retailers and 
merchants in that state.  Credit Data had embarked on the shift from manual to 
computerized methods in 1965, but TRW completed the process, operating a large 
mainframe in Anaheim, California with 50 million names, selling “credit profiles” on 
request to lenders.  Those who availed themselves of TRW’s credit reporting service were 
required to share their data on customers and borrowers.87  In other cases, existing 
independent bureaus and regional systems managed the shift to new methods and 
technologies, notably Retail Credit Company of Georgia, which transformed itself into 
Equifax.  By the late 1960s consumer credit reporting was clearly moving to consolidation 
and to sharing information in large computerized databanks.88   
Banks had initially set up credit card approval and authorization systems to cover 
their own customers, but by 1966 two nationwide card associations were in operation, 
National Bank of Americard, Inc., or NBI, and Interbank Card Association.  NBI changed its 
name to VISA in 1976, and Interbank evolved into MasterCard.89  Eventually these 
networks would grow to include over six thousand banks each (1998 figure), and spur a 
nationwide competition that drove down interest rates and increased access to credit.  
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for the construction of a rapid nationwide verification system, while also accumulating vast 
panels of data that helped to underwrite consumer credit marketing.90  As they came to 
dominate the verification and data interchange business of credit cards, the card 
associations promoted use and acceptance by guaranteeing payment nationwide and 
simplifying payment clearings between banks.91  
 By the mid 1970s, all the elements of a revised consumer credit reporting structure 
were in place.  Banks, merchants, and credit bureaus exchanged vast quantities of data on 
consumers, ranging from transaction and payment experience, to the more traditional 
personal data, now in standardized, machine readable form.  Although twenty years earlier, 
consumer credit reporting was controlled by retail merchants, banks and local credit 
agencies, these organizations had been replaced or supplanted by a few large entities, 
notably the card association and a handful of giant credit bureaus.  With information on 
consumer credit standardized and centralized in this way, it became easier for credit 
reporting to be done using quantitative data and the probability based algorithms first 
outlined in the 1940s and 1950s.  Numerical credit scoring, started in rudimentary form in 
the 1950s, bloomed amidst a fertile sea of data, culminating in the FICO score, introduced 
in the 1980s.92 
One final factor should be noted in this shift, one that again contrasts the 
institutional context of consumer credit with trade credit—the law.  Whereas as we have 
seen, legal precedent forced Dun and other credit reporting agencies to tread lightly, 
walking a fine line between restricting the spread of credit information and distributing it 
in an efficient manner, nearly the opposite was the case in consumer credit.  As reporting 
moved to its computerized, quantitative form in the 1970s, the law if anything put a P a g e  | 32 
 
premium on reducing the variety and personal nature of consumer data, while making 
credit information more widely available.  
Reacting to charges that individuals were denied credit based on innuendo, hearsay 
and lifestyle choices irrelevant to risk, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 
1970.  The act required reporting agencies to maintain accurate files, purge unverifiable 
information and permit credit seekers to access and correct their files.  It took particular 
aim the investigative procedures used by the traditional credit reporters, the gumshoe 
agencies that had for decades gathered both personal and financial information on 
consumers.  In 1974 responding to pressure by women’s rights organizations, Congress 
added the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which forbade credit discrimination on the basis of 
sex or marital status, undercutting the long tradition of rating women lower than men for 
credit and giving credit to married women only through their husbands.  The act also 
banned the use of certain categories pertaining to race and ethnic status.93  Finally, in 1976 
Congress opened hearings on privacy and the private sector, following on a number of 
investigations about records and data on citizens held in government agencies.  
The upshot of the legislation and investigations was to make computer data banks 
and behavioral or transactional information the answer to concerns about privacy or 
prejudice.  If women or African Americans were denied credit because wittingly or 
consciously credit evaluators took race, marital status, or personal lifestyle into account, 
then credit scoring based strictly on patterns of credit use, plus a limited number of 
individual attributes (such as address or occupation) provided a defense against charges of 
discrimination.94  If the rich and varied records on individuals kept by thousands of small 
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data available only by those with authorized access, overseen by a small number of large 
corporate entities, provided greater security and superior accuracy.95   
While the privacy hearings considered the danger that corporate databanks 
centralized too much information, investigators in the end only recommended better 
security procedures, enacted by computer professionals, rather than limits on the size of 
those databanks.  What the investigations pointedly did not do was recommend legislation 
comparable to the 1974 Privacy Act for government.  For all the dangers posed by 
databanks in a free society, their potential to eliminate traditional forms of discrimination 
through hard data, combined with the efficiency they offered to credit granters, made them 
appear more equalitarian and less liable to abuse than traditional methods that 
emphasized character and the narrative of lifestyle.96  In accord with previous legislation 
on credit and lending, notably the Consumer Credit Protection Act, the belief was that more 
information processed more cheaply and encompassing more people would lower the cost 
of credit to the poor and minorities, while increasing transparency to protect the consumer 
or borrower.97  All these outcomes required, it was argued, the shift to the new, high 
powered computerized credit reporting systems, and the move to quantifiable, 
standardized forms of information, to what looked like an objective credit score.   
 
The FICO Moment 
Credit scoring relied on probability and correlation linking certain variables connected to a 
borrower to certain outcomes, notably probability of repayment.  This was a powerful tool 
of prediction when applied to populations, but it did not incorporate a causal model of 
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can be predictive of outcomes, the scoring models themselves did not set limits on what 
should be included and what should be left out.  In theory, race, religion, ethnicity, gender, 
location, job, level of education could all be statistically valid predictors of repayment.98  In 
an attempt to shift credit scoring to a causal basis, congressional investigations and laws 
pushed credit reporting firms to rely less on databanks of personal characteristics and 
more on credit and payment experience.  Behavioral based assessment seemed fairer—
since it was one’s most recent actions that determined the credit score.  Although the 
legacy of discrimination and poverty still worked against those with little or no credit 
history, expanding access to credit would, presumably, correct that problem in time.   
  The FICO score, based largely on recent past behavior, was almost 180 degrees from 
the narrative in form.  It denied rather than affirmed the notion that credit should reflect a 
notion of moral character.  Yet like the narrative, it both selected information for decision 
making out of vast sea of facts, and directed the decision maker toward certain conclusions.  
Like narrative it presumed that people rose and fell of their own accord, once context was 
properly account for, and allowed for second chances.  The credit score, like the credit 
narrative, was a temporarily stable artifact of meaning emerging out of conflicting 
institutions, interest and policies.  But as an artifact, it hid its origins and limitations.  It 
became a widely accepted black box, put to use for all sorts of new tasks. 
In the 1990s, general acceptance of the FICO score led Freddie Mac to use it for 
mortgages as well.  With credit ratings attached to individual mortgages, bond rating 
agencies were then able to rate packages of asset backed securities.  Indeed, without FICO, 
Standard & Poor’s and other bond raters would have lacked the method to rate individual 
mortgages composing the tranches of debt obligations.99  Scalability of risk measurement, P a g e  | 35 
 
standardization of information, and reduction of complex individual data into a single, 
universally recognized score made mortgage underwriting and securitization easier, and 
allowed for finer distinctions among risk pools.  But it was a method that was only valid to 
the extent that recent past behavior predicted future behavior, based as it was on the 
shallow information compressed into the FICO score.  It worked best when conditions in 
the future were very much like those of the past, and became unstable in the face of sudden 
changes in conditions or behavior.  The history, and hence assumptions and limitations of 
FICO, were either lost or ignored.  The consequences of ignoring history we are living with 
still.   
 
Conclusion 
In most studies of credit, risk and reporting, information has been treated ontologically—as 
tending toward a state of perfection, idealized as transparency.  In this study, I have argued 
that information should be treated epistemologically, as the artifact of certain agreed upon 
conventions arising out of the construction of a system of knowledge.  Seen this way, 
information cannot be the cure for market imperfections, opportunism, self-interest and 
uncertainty, because information itself is derived from a social process no less 
characterized by self-interest and no less institutional than the markets it is meant to 
regulate.  Thus, the recent breakdown in financial market risk assessment might be seen, 
traditionally, as a problem of insufficient transparency.  But it might also be treated, on a 
deeper level, as a problem rooted in the institutional nature of knowledge.   
As Charles Perrow has noted, great disasters happen when actors assume they fully 
comprehend complex systems and are confident those systems generate information that P a g e  | 36 
 
can reveal dangers in any given situation.100  But systems only reveal what they are 
designed to reveal.  When conditions diverge strongly from those that existed when the 
system was designed, the information will be inadequate to the task.  The accumulation of 
information works against transparency, either overloading actors and making it difficult 
to separate signal from noise, or creating new informational asymmetries.  As information 
gets noisy, actors tend to focus on a few predictors, the ones (as in Perrow’s complex 
technologies) generated by the most salient behaviors in the system at that moment.  It 
then becomes more not less difficult to see the black swan. 
Since information systems, as I have argued, emerge historically, out of contingent 
conditions, growing without a master plan, reflecting institutional barriers, negotiating the 
interests of different parties, there can be no perfect information system.  There can be no 
point to stand outside the system and monitor it, but only another information system, 
equally contingent, equally institutionalized.   We might, however, gain some insight and 
avoid some disasters if we learn and study the history of information systems.  Then, at 
least, we might see the risks and unknowns built from our attempts to manage risks and 
unknowns.  P a g e  | 37 
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